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Since the 1980s biotechnology has been promoted as a symbol of European progress.  As a 
clean technology, agbiotech was meant to enhance efficient agri-production and thus fulfil the 
beneficent promise of a European Biosociety, like its counterpart of the Information Society.  
By the early 1990s biotech symbolised the ‘knowledge-based society’ and eventually the 
Lisbon agenda.  At the 2000 Lisbon meeting of the European Council, Ministers committed 
the EU to become ‘the most competitive and dynamic, knowledge-based economy in the 
world, capable of sustainable growth with more and better jobs’.   
 
By then, however, agbiotech was becoming stigmatised, opposed and blocked 
throughout Europe.  ‘GM food’ was widely portrayed as a pollutant contaminating science, 
agriculture, the environment and democratic sovereignty.  The phrase ‘GM-free’ was playing 
a role similar to ‘nuclear-free’ in the 1980s.  Few farmers have chosen to cultivate the GM 
crops which gained EU approval for commercial use.  Even for such products, safety claims 
have remained in dispute.  
 
How did agbiotech undergo such a reversal of its early status and economic ambition?  
Answers can be found by locating agbiotech within a wider political-economic project – and 
vice versa.  In this article the concept of ‘safety’ will be elaborated in several ways: as 
contending accounts of risks to be clarified, and as a metaphor for a socio-political system 
favourable or not to agbiotech.  
 
Risk issues proliferated and expanded from the late 1980s onwards.  Questions were 
asked about whether or how GMOs could be made predictably safe for the environment.  In 
the margins of this risk debate, a philosopher turned that predictive question into a normative 
issue.  He analysed how organisms were being standardised for predictable, efficient agri-
industrial uses through genetic modification, and thus how nature was being made safe for 
agbiotech (Sagoff 1991).  This re-ordering of nature as standard commodities meant a 
normative shift in what counts as natural, beneficial, rational, etc.  
 
Expanding on his insight, this article analyses how an entire socio-political system.  
How was Europe being re-ordered in ways more favourable to agbiotech in the 1990s?  What 
difficulties were encountered?  How was Europe becoming less safe for agbiotech by the end 
of the decade?  
 
The article draws upon analytical concepts of socio-natural orders.  Any technology is 
co-produced with specific forms of social and natural order; these are promoted through 
discourses of promises to address threats of disorder.  Technoscientific developments can be 
understood as socio-technical hybrid constructs, ordering society in particular ways, as if these 
derived from separate ‘natural’ characteristics (Jasanoff 2004: 21).  Stable success depends 
upon creating both those implicit links and explicit separations.  Whenever a technology 
becomes contentious, power struggles arise over how to define the issues at stake – over what 
is ‘the technology’ and what problems need solutions.   
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1.  Making Europe safe for agbiotech 
Agbiotech was originally promoted as a multiple technological saviour: GM techniques would 
improve crops for both economic efficiency and environmental protection, especially by 
reducing agrochemical usage.  These benefits were attributed to inherent properties of GM 
crops as smart seeds.  Inefficiency was attributed to deficient inputs and a wild, disorderly 
Nature threatening crops.  The inherent hazards of intensive monoculture were represented as 
external threats of disorder, which could be re-ordered through a molecular-level technofix: 
crops must be improved by editing their genetic information.     
 
The search for molecular knowledge has featured metaphors of computer codes, which 
derive from the 1930s’ science of molecular biology.  This reconceptualized 'life' in physico-
chemical terms: DNA became coded 'information' which could be freely transferred across the 
species barrier. A ‘molecular vision of life’ diagnosed societal problems as genetic 
deficiencies (Kay 1992). This informatic concept was favoured by the Rockefeller Foundation 
and government-funding bodies.   
 
Through molecular biology, genetic engineering facilitated the development of novel 
commodities.  'As technology controlled by capital, it is a specific mode of the appropriation 
of living nature – literally capitalizing life' (Yoxen 1981).  Genetic engineering was celebrated 
as ‘a natural science’, by reference to natural recombination of genetic material (Monsanto 
1984).   
 
The global biotechnological agenda was led by the US agri-industrial complex and its 
government supporters.  Long beforehand, these institutions had turned agriculture into a rural 
factory of standardised commodity production, especially for animal feed and global export.  
In the 1990s agbiotech innovation complemented and extended that agri-industrial system, 
with the promise of alleviating its environmental damage through eco-efficient inputs.  The 
development and adoption of GM crops were promoted through new policies – broader patent 
rights giving financial incentives to public-sector research, ‘product-based regulation’ 
normalising GM crops as safe, and trade liberalisation opening foreign markets to US agri-
exports.   
 
These policies linked neoliberal models of the natural and social order.  In such models, 
market competition provides a naturally benign regulator, driving innovation as a basis for 
societal progress.  Neoliberal policies promote the societal capacity to compete for economic 
advantage in the marketplace, while also creating new opportunities to marketise resources, 
thus elaborating a ‘competition state’ (Cerny 1999).  In the agbiotech case, natural resources 
were invested with engineering and industrial metaphors, e.g. smart seeds, attributing human 
powers to commodity agri-inputs.  ‘Market liberalism and technocracy set the agenda, not 
democracy…  the economism of globalisation discourse is combined with an authoritarian 
technological determinism’ (Barben 1998: 417).  
 
The US model of intensive agri-industrial production was appropriated as an inevitable 
European future.  Since the 1980s a ‘Biosociety’ was being promoted within a general 
European policy of eco-efficient innovation.  New policies sought to make Europe safe for 
agbiotech as normal products, while marginalising any opportunities for dissent or alternative 
development paths.   
 
Soon this became linked with a neoliberal agenda.  Invoking objective imperatives of 
global competition, the European Commission promoted agbiotech as essential for economic 
competitiveness and thus for survival of the European agri-food sector, along lines similar to 
the US model of industrial agriculture.  By the mid-1990s the EU and the US were 
cooperating to remove ‘barriers to transatlantic trade’ through regulatory harmonisation, 
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especially for biotech products, as means to liberalise trade across the Atlantic (Murphy and 
Levidow 2006).   
 
EC policies also facilitated efforts to commoditise human and natural resources.   In 
1988 a draft EC directive extended patent rights to ‘biotechnological inventions’, thus 
broadening the scope of discoveries or techniques which could be privatised and then accrue 
royalty payments.  With such language, discovery of a common resource was presented as an 
invention warranting proprietary rights.  According to a representative of a major 
pharmaceutical firm, Smith Kline Beecham, ‘Genes are the currency of the future’ (cited in 
Emmott 2001: 378).  This new discourse naturalised the commoditisation of nature as a 
patentable human artifice.  After a decade-long conflict, the Directive was enacted (EC 
1998a).  It was meant to resolve political conflicts regarding the patentability of GM crops 
(among other issues), and thus stabilise rules for the EU internal market.  Yet some member 
states soon objected to the Directive, even bringing judicial challenges, and many more had 
not transposed it into national law a few years later.  ‘Biotechnogical inventions’ remained 
controversial as ‘Patents on Life’ or ‘biopiracy’.  
 
In some countries, public-sector research institutes were allocated less state funds than before 
and were expected to substitute income from the private sector or from patents, e.g. through GM 
techniques.  EU R&D funding priorities complemented that shift towards a marketisation policy for 
hitherto ‘public-sector’ research, now blurring the boundary between public and private sectors 
(Levidow et al 2002).  By 1990 EC funds for biotech research became dependent upon industry 
partners committing resources to a proposed project.  Research was given a clear economic function, 
with ‘more careful attention to the long-term needs of industry’, according to managers of the DG-
Research Biotechnology Division (Magnien and Nettancourt 1993: 51).  Together these policies 
created greater financial incentives for agricultural research to use GM techniques.   
 
For safety issues the EC’s 1990 legislation had set an implicitly precautionary 
framework, requiring that each GMO release have a prior evaluation of potential risks to 
human health and the environment.  By the early 1990s, however, the precautionary content 
was constrained by a new policy of ‘risk-based regulation’, which shifted the regulatory 
burden of evidence towards demonstrating risks.  Regulatory conflicts emerged over how to 
ensure in advance that GM crops fulfil the promise of environmental improvement.  Efforts to 
verify these promises were marginalised by neoliberal policies in the mid-1990s, when 
agbiotech regulation was put on the defensive for supposedly impeding innovation.   
 
For specific GM products, official risk assessments accepted the normal hazards of 
intensive monoculture, e.g. pest resistance to pesticides.  These normative aspects 
complemented the EU policy framework of higher productivity for economic competitiveness.  
Europe was being deterritorialised as a purely economic zone for circulating commodities, as 
if products and risk assessment had no cultural values (Barry 2001: 70).  In this way, GM 
products were becoming symbolically normalised as safe products.   
 
No special GM labelling was required.  Any such requirement was opposed on several 
grounds: for lacking any scientific basis, unfairly impeding the internal market, and making 
the EU vulnerable to a US challenge under WTO rules.  Without labelling, GM grain would 
be invisibly mixed with other grain in processed food.  As unwitting consumers of GM food, 
the public were modelled as supporters of a beneficial technology serving the common good.   
 
By the mid-1990s EC policies were making Europe safe for agbiotech to achieve 
commercial success, by modelling European society along neoliberal lines.  All social actors 
were cast in market roles – as business partners, competitors, clients, consumers, etc..  
Societal decisions on agbiotech were reduced to a case-by-case regulatory approval of GM 
products, on the basis of expert advice.  Public accountability meant regulatory procedures for 
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authorising ‘safe’ GM products, which could then freely circulate throughout the EU internal 
market.   
 
Those arrangements lay at the nexus of several political agendas which attracted dissent.  
A technicist harmonization agenda treated regulatory standards as merely technical issues 
standing above socio-cultural values, as a basis for ‘completing the internal market’ of the EU.  
The US neoliberal framework was being adapted, but dissent arose from the start, thus 
signalling conflicts that would intensify later.  Rules of the internal market depended upon 
acceptance (or at least submission) by EU member states, which increasingly objected to the 
early neoliberal framework and sometimes even defied its rules.  
 
2.  Agri-efficiency as a solution or hazard? 
 
Since the mid-1990s the biotechnology industry has appropriated the phrase ‘sustainable 
agriculture’, cast in its own image of intensive monoculture.  Proponents emphasised benefits 
of reducing agrochemical usage, deploying resources more efficiently, increasing productivity, 
and so enhancing economic competitiveness.  For example, GM crops will continue ‘the 
progress of high-yield agriculture’ (Monsanto 1997: 16).  Likewise, according to Novartis, 
GM insecticidal maize 'contributes to sustainable agriculture’, even the ‘sustainable 
intensification of agriculture’ (Imhof 1998; cited in Levidow 2005).  From this perspective, 
society faces a common problem: the risk of failing to reap the benefits. 
 
EU policy likewise supported agbiotech as an ecoefficient innovation.  According to the 
Economic and Social Committee, biotechnological solutions are 'guaranteeing yields, helping 
to cut the use of plant health products in combating pests and diseases, and creating quality 
products'.  Thanks to its precise techniques, moreover, genetic engineering 'allows more 
accurately targeted risk prediction', argued the committee (EcoSoc 1998).  In this promotional 
account, biotechnological precision and efficiency could be extended to risk assessment, 
readily clarifying any uncertainties.    
 
By the mid-1990s such assumptions were becoming a greater source and focus of 
European public distrust towards regulatory authorities.  In particular, the 1996 ‘mad cow’ 
controversy had resulted from animal feed containing animal remains and unknown infected 
material.  This was still biologically active due to a deregulatory change in requirements for 
heat treatment, and the feed could freely circulate in the EU internal market.  As a further 
basis for political scandal, expert advice had implicitly made policy assumptions, e.g. that 
real-world practices would follow risk-management guidelines and thus avoid any infectious 
spread (Jasanoff 1997; Millstone and van Zwanenberg 2001).  The Commission likewise 
covered up the problem, for fear that public concern about the BSE problem would endanger 
the European beef market, according to a report by the European Parliament (1997).   
 
The scandal was turned into a European crisis of industrial agriculture by its critics.  
Drawing analogies to the ‘mad cow’ epidemic, opponents pejoratively associated agbiotech 
with factory farming, its health hazards, and globalisation.  In both sectors, regulatory 
procedures came under attack for pre-empting or concealing political decisions in the guise of 
‘science’.  Two GM products became test cases for these issues; indeed, the products were 
turned into high-profile symbols of a dangerous, disorderly technology and irresponsible 
government policy. 
 
In 1996 Monsanto’s GM soybean received EU-wide commercial authorisation for food 
and feed import, without any requirement for GM labelling.  When US soya shipments arrived 
in late 1996, these provided a high-profile target for agbiotech opponents.  A French 
 5 
newspaper article was headlined ‘Alerte au Soja Fou’ – mad soya alert (Libération Paris 
01.11.96).  This metaphor highlighted disorders of government and product behaviour in the 
BSE episode.  At several ports, Greenpeace staged a symbolic blockage with rubber dinghies, 
temporarily delaying the shipments, thus gaining publicity for its anti-GM message.  NGOs 
accused companies and governments of ‘force-feeding us GM food’. 
 
In January 1997 the Commission approved Ciba-Geigy’s Bt 176 insecticidal maize for 
import and cultivation, despite opposition from most member states.   According to EU expert 
committees, there was no evidence of risk from the product.  Some national experts dissented.  
In particular they highlighted risks that its antibiotic-resistance gene could spread to 
pathogenic microbes, thus undermining the clinical efficacy of the antibiotic.  Such experts 
and NGOs drew analogies to animal husbandry over-using antibiotics, thus spreading 
resistance.  NGOs and some member states also demanded a ‘GM’ labelling requirement; this 
demand led to disagreements among Commissioners and procedural delays, before finally 
granting approval.  In a Belgian newspaper, the Commission was denounced for ‘recidivism’, 
by reference to its previous role in covering up health hazards of beef (Rich 1997).   
 
The Bt 176 approval decision was criticised by a broad range of civil society 
organisations.  These included consumer NGOs, which did not necessarily oppose agbiotech 
but demanded more rigorous risk assessments and GM labelling for consumer choice.  In 
April 1997 the Commission was denounced by the European Parliament.   
 
Risk assessment of GM food was criticised for optimistic assumptions, for dependence 
upon scientific ignorance, and for a commitment to industrial agriculture.  Further analogies 
were drawn to the BSE crisis: 
There was an implicit [government] assumption that the public would be broadly 
supportive of measures that improved productivity.  Subsequent outcry demonstrated 
that the public did not accept that the risks of such an ‘unnatural’ practice were 
justified by the increased ‘efficiency’ of meat production (Greenpeace 1997).  
With the sarcastic slogan, ‘How to destroy the beef industry and learn nothing’, this report 
also echoed the attacks on the Commission over approval of Bt 176 maize. 
 
Originating in a loose network of activist groups, in the late 1990s an anti-GM 
movement emerged, led by environmentalist groups, especially Greenpeace Europe, Friends 
of the Earth Europe (FoEE) and their national affiliates.  Another key opponent was the 
Coordination Paysanne Européenne and its national affiliates, representing relatively less-
intensive or small-scale farmers; they opposed the entire agri-industrial model, while 
counterposing extensification measures as an alternative.  GM crops were widely stigmatised 
as ‘contamination’ jeopardising benign alternatives.  Although consumer NGOs did not 
oppose agbiotech, they took up agri-environmental issues as well as GM food safety.  Protest 
linked GM food with potential environmental risks of cultivating GM crops.   
 
Through the agbiotech issue, diverse European movements ‘found a unifying topic like 
no other’, helped by ‘the fact that genetic engineering touches virtually all areas of life’, 
according to an anti-biotech campaigner.  These campaigns crossed the usual boundaries 
between environmental, consumer and farmer issues.  National NGOs intervened at the 
European level.  All shared a common aim: ‘stopping the technology from infiltrating the food 
and agricultural sectors’ (Schweiger 2001: 371). 
 
When mass protest emerged in the late 1990s, then, risk discourses framed agri-
industrial efficiency as a threat.  Agbiotech critics diagnosed the agricultural problem as 
intensive monocultural practices, global standardisation and farmer dependence upon 
multinational companies.  Thus agbiotech intersected with a wider debate over agricultural 
and societal futures.  
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3.  National controversies: agbiotech vs sustainable agriculture 
In the late 1990s ‘sustainable agriculture' was being appropriated in divergent ways by 
advocates and opponents of agbiotech.  In Europe 'sustainable agriculture' has been 
increasingly defined by distinct cultural values, linking the quality of food products, rural 
space and livelihoods. Although chemical-intensive methods still prevail, the countryside has 
been increasingly regarded as an environmental issue, variously understood – e.g. as an 
aesthetic landscape, a wildlife habitat, local heritage, a stewardship role for farmers, and their 
economic independence.   
 
Such accounts of sustainable agriculture increasingly informed national regulatory 
approaches to GM products in the late 1990s, thus diverging from the eco-efficiency account 
presumed by agbiotech innovation.  Some national examples below illustrate those policy 
developments.  France and the UK have special significance: originally their governments led 
efforts to gain EU-wide approval for GM crops, but later their policies became more cautious.  
Agbiotech was increasingly cast as a problem for sustainable agriculture.  Consequently, EU-




Denmark’s environmental legislation has affirmed the general aim of ‘sustainable 
development’ since the 1980s.  It also had a policy to reduce agrochemical usage, especially 
so that ground water could be used safely as drinking water.  The Danish approach valued 
groundwater as a common resource, thus favouring more extensive cultivation methods which 
would use fewer pesticides.   
 
Citing that policy aim, NGOs criticised the long-term implications of GM herbicide-
tolerant crops for herbicide usage and residues, especially in groundwater.  In the mid-1990s 
they successfully pressed the Danish Parliament to raise such questions about herbicide-
tolerant crops within Danish regulatory procedures.  Under this Parliamentary pressure, the 
Environment Ministry adopted broad risk-assessment criteria along those lines, thus providing 
a basis for a broad national consensus on regulatory procedures (Toft 1996).   
 
Within that policy framework of sustainable agriculture, Denmark’s broad criteria went 
beyond the risk assessment in most other EU member states, which evaluated simply whether 
a GM crop per se would cause harm.  Consequently, Denmark objected to the risk 
assessments of every herbicide-tolerant crop proposed for EU-wide commercialization, on 
grounds that they did not evaluate the long-term implications for herbicide usage (Toft 2000).  
Eventually these objections gained support from more member states, who together stimulated 
an EU policy shift towards broader assessments.  This approach became difficult for the 




In Austria agbiotech was turned into a symbolic threat to organic agriculture.  Even before 
GM crops became a high-profile issue there in the mid-1990s, the Austrian government was 
promoting organic farming – as ecologically sound, as quality products, and as an 
economically feasible market-niche alternative for an endangered national agriculture.  This 
'competitiveness' strategy conflicted with the pro-biotechnology imperative to increase 
agricultural productivity.   
 
 7 
Some government officials regarded agricultural biotechnology as a threat to the 
environment and an obstacle to sustainability.  Austrian regulators unfavourably compared 
potential environmental effects of GM crops with methods which use no agrochemicals, as 
grounds to oppose commercial approval.  When NGOs campaigned against agbiotech, they 
effectively reinforced the government’s stance (Torgerson and Seifert 2000).   
 
As a GM-free Austria nearly became a national consensus, the government sought 
stronger means to justify this policy, especially given its conflict with EU legislation.  Austria 
banned several GM crops after they obtained EU approval, while making detailed criticisms 
of the official risk assessments and safety claims.  In Austria’s own risk-benefit analysis, risks 
were always uncertain, while benefit was understood as promoting the political aim of a 
society oriented towards sustainability (ibid).   
 
To justify restrictions on GM products, civil servants linked the Precautionary Principle 
with sustainable development – a link already in the 1992 Rio Declaration.  In addition, 
Austria’s law on biotechnology had a ‘social sustainability’ clause, which prohibits 
‘inappropriate disadvantages’ for societal groups through biotechnology. Civil servants 
anticipated using this clause to justify strict rules for segregating GM crops, thus deterring 




Italian agbiotech opponents sought to protect the agro-food chain as an environment for craft 
methods and local specialty products, known as prodotti tipici.  In the late 1990s the Italian 
Parliament had already allocated subsidies to promote such products and foresaw these being 
displaced by GM crops.  According to a Parliamentary report, the government must 'prevent 
Italian agriculture from becoming dependent on multinational companies due to the 
introduction of genetically manipulated seeds'.  Moreover, argued the report, when local 
administrations apply EU legislation on sustainable agriculture, they should link these criteria 
with a requirement to use only non-GM materials.  Parliament endorsed such proposals 
(Terragni and Recchia 1999).   
 
Such anti-agbiotech demands gained widespread support, especially from the Coltivatori 
Diretti, a million-strong union of mainly small-scale farmers.  Environmental NGOs, farmers 
and food retailers built a national network seeking to exclude GM products from Italian 
agriculture.  This network successfully maintained Italy’s political and commercial opposition 
through government changes.  When Romano Prodi’s L’Ulivo (Olive Tree) coalition was 
replaced by Berlusconi’s Casa delle Libertà coalition in 1996, its policy generally shifted 
along neoliberal lines; and the new government included strong advocates of agbiotech.  Yet 
Italian officials continued to deter or block GM field trials and to oppose product approval.   
 
That policy was often translated into risk arguments in EU-level regulatory procedures.  
When a company requested authorisation to import GM rapeseed in 2003, for example, Italy 
argued that any escaped seed could contaminate related plants and thus undermine centres of 
diversity for Brassica crops.  This risk argument effectively served to exclude GM crops and 





In 1996 the NGO Ecoropa initiated a petition emphasising unknown risks of GM crops, as a 
basis to advocate a moratorium.  It was signed by several hundred scientists, many seeking 
more stringent regulation rather than a ban.  Soon critics were putting the government onto the 
defensive for failing to protect France from risks of GM crops. 
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In 1997 greater controversy emerged over Agrevo’s GM herbicide-tolerant oilseed rape, 
which had a great capacity to spread its genes.  Expert advisors anticipated that weeds would 
eventually acquire resistance to broad-spectrum herbicides, thus jeopardising and 
complicating future methods for weed control in agriculture.  In early 1998 the Institut 
National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) abandoned its joint innovation research with 
seed companies on GM herbicide-tolerant oilseed rape, partly in order to protect the neutral 
reputation of its research on environmental risks.  In March 1998 Agrevo decided to destroy 
its own field trials of this crop in France, in order to avoid further unfavourable publicity.  
Invoking the Precautionary Principle, moreover, in November 1998 the government 
announced that this product would not be approved for commercial use – even though France 
had previously led the EU-wide procedure for such approval (Roy and Joly 2000).   
 
Another GM crop became a major controversy in France.  Novartis’ insecticidal Bt 176 
had generated controversy about several risks including its antibiotic-resistance marker gene.  
In 1996 the European Commission approved the product, despite opposition from all member 
states except France, which was acting as the rapporteur for the proposal.  The French 
government was accused of favouring commercial interests over scientific criteria.  According 
to Ecoropa, ‘Obviously, the French government surrendered to interests of multinational 
agrochemical companies and its decision is entirely commercially motivated’ (quoted in FoEE 
1997).   
 
During 1997 the French government initially refused to confirm the approval and then 
later approved Bt 176 maize. Ecoropa and Greenpeace filed a challenge at the Conseil d’Etat, 
the administrative high court, on several grounds – that the risks had not been properly 
assessed, that the correct administrative procedures had not been followed, and that the 
precautionary principle had not been properly applied.  Their arguments gained some support 
in the court’s interim ruling in September 1998, though not in the final one (Roy and Joly 
2000).   
 
In the late 1990s the French agbiotech debate expanded from ‘risk’ to sustainability 
issues, featuring divisions among farmers.  The Fédération Nationale des Syndicats 
d'Exploitants Agricoles (FNSEA) represented industrial-type farmers, who sought access to 
GM crops as a means to enhance their economic competitiveness.  In the name of ‘sustainable 
production’, they also anticipated environmental benefits such as reductions in the use of 
pesticides and water.  As a means to control the European cornborer pest, they sought access 
to insecticidal Bt maize, e.g. Bt 176 or Monsanto’s MON 810 which gained EU-wide 
approval in 1998.  
 
By contrast, the Left-wing farmers’ trade union Confédération Paysanne (henceforth 
Conf) denounced such products as a threat to their skills and livelihoods.  According to their 
spokespersons, such as Jose Bové, GM crops pose risks to their economic independence, to 
high-quality French products, to consumer choice and even to democracy.   Those values were 
expressed in the Conf slogan, 'For another agriculture: Produce, Employ, Conserve'. This 
slogan resonated with produits de terroir, a marketing label which denotes its origin from 
specific localities and peasant producers.  They promoted a paysan savoir-faire, as a basis for 
a different societal future, independent of commoditized agri-inputs from multinational 
companies.  In those ways, they also ‘set in motion a discourse and an activist strategy that 
would later counter the risk hegemony of the French GMO debate’ (Heller 2002: 16).   
 
Thus the French public controversy was extended to agri-innovation choices, far beyond 
environmental risk issues.  Although French farmers were expected to adopt Bt maize on a 
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larger scale, few did so, given uncertainties about the market prospects (see section on Market 
Forces).  
 
United Kingdom  
 
In the run-up to protests against the G8 Summit in Birmingham in May 1998, an activists’ 
meeting set up ‘GenetiX Snowball: a campaign of civil responsibility’.  Snowballers 
collectively, openly ‘decontaminated’ GM maize fields, thus encouraging others to follow 
their example.  To claim legitimacy, they quoted the UK Deputy Minister of Agriculture: 'The 
government is not in the driving seat'.  He meant that commercialization was driven by 
companies and by EU decisions to approve their GM products, thus allowing little choice for 
member states.  According to the activists, 'Our democratic system has failed us; government 
has waived its responsibility... Meanwhile transnational corporations hold the reins and pull 
the strings of power' (GenetiX Snowball leaflet 1998).  Thus the technology and its 
authorisation were framed as an undemocratic, sinister control. 
 
The initial opposition movement was joined by large NGOs, especially Greenpeace and 
Friends of the Earth.  Through various pollution metaphors, opponents stigmatized all 
institutions which might promote, authorise or sell GM products.  ‘GM contamination’ had 
diverse meanings, for example:  unnatural genetic combinations posing unknown ecological 
risks, money interests perverting science, multinational companies controlling seeds, etc.; 
globalization corrupting national democratic procedures; intensive methods further 
industrializing agriculture and perpetuating technological dependence; and pollen flow 
contaminating non-GM crops, thus denying consumer choice (Levidow 2000). 
 
A loose network of activists, the Genetic Engineering Alliance, proposed a ‘Five Year 
Freeze’ on the commercial use, import or patenting of GM products. Its February 1999 
manifesto criticized shortcomings of the regulatory system and demanded public involvement 
in such decisions.  Soon the coalition had attracted more than forty members, including 
consumer, environmental, development and quasi-governmental organizations. 
 
Regulatory conflict focused on GM herbicide-tolerant crops, which were designed to 
replace specific herbicides with broad-spectrum herbicides which kill all vegetation.  
According to proponents, these crops would help farmers to minimise herbicide sprays and so 
protect wildlife habitats in or near agricultural fields.  According to critics, broad-spectrum 
herbicides could increase such harm.  In 1997 the government's own nature conservation 
advisors advocated a delay in commercial use of herbicide-tolerant crops, pending additional 
research.   
 
The government had no clear responsibility for these issues until 1998, when the 
Environment Ministry announced a three-year moratorium in order to facilitate the ‘managed 
development’ of GM herbicide-tolerant crops.  An ambitious plan for farm-scale evaluations 
would compare the effects on farmland biodiversity of spraying GM and conventional crops, 
as a means to ensure environmental protection.  Thus a broader account of environmental 
harm delayed any regulatory decision for several years.  In parallel, from a UK initiative, the 
EU Environment Council (and eventually the Commission) incorporated that broader account 
into EU law.  
 
4.  EU-wide regulatory conflicts 
In the mid-1990s national regulators had generally accepted safety claims by companies, while 
acknowledging that GM crops could cause some undesirable effects.  If weeds acquired 
tolerance to herbicides, or if insects acquired resistance to GM toxins, thus undermining the 
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pest-control agent, then such effects were regarded as acceptable or irrelevant to EU 
legislation for regulating GMOs.  Herbicide-tolerant crops were designed for farmers to 
substitute broad-spectrum herbicides, which kill all other plants, yet there was no institutional 
responsibility for the wider environmental effects.   
 
In such ways, risk assessment accepted the normal hazards of intensive monoculture for 
an innovation which promised to reduce agrichemical usage; regulatory criteria were framed 
by an ecoefficiency account of sustainable agriculture. This agri-industrial ordering of natural 
resources complemented a particular socio-political order: economic-competitive pressures to 
maximise agricultural productivity, with minimal regulatory standards facilitating safety 
claims.  This policy framework was reinforced by the European Commission, especially in 
driving the EU regulatory procedure towards approval of specific GM products, e.g. Bt 
insecticidal maize and herbicide-tolerant oilseed rape in 1996-97.   
 
By the late 1990s, facing greater public opposition to agbiotech, some national 
authorities shifted their regulatory policy.  They evaluated GM crops on a relatively broader 
basis to protect various crop-protection methods (naturally occurring Bt insecticides and 
relatively benign herbicides) and public goods (e.g. safe drinking water, organic agriculture, 
local specialty products, etc.)  These resources were seen as under threat from industrial 
agriculture in general and GM crops in particular.  Implicitly or explicitly, national regulatory 
frameworks linked biotechnological risk with unsustainable agriculture (as described in the 
previous section).   
 
The Deliberate Release Directive was meant to link environmental protection with 
‘completion of the internal market’ through harmonised standards (EEC 1990).  Conflicts 
arose over the standards that would shape a market for agbiotech products.  By the late 1990s, 
member states were disagreeing more sharply about how to define the ‘adverse effects’ which 
warrant evaluation and prevention.  Diverse agri-environmental issues came from national 
norms – e.g. organic agriculture in Austria, drinking water policy in Denmark, farmland 
biodiversity in the UK, weed-control issues in France, etc. – in conflict with the intensive agri-
industrial model which underlay biotech innovation and official risk assessments.  
 
Regulatory conflicts intensified over the basis for commercial approval of new GM 
products.  Proposals for broader risk assessments gained support from more member states in 
the late 1990s (Levidow et al 1996, 2007; Levidow and Carr 2000).  Greater conflicts delayed 
the EU decision procedure.  In June 1999 several Environment Ministers signed statements 
opposing the approval of any more GM products until regulatory criteria were strengthened, 
including a requirement for traceability and labelling of all GM material, as well as precaution 
as the basis of risk assessment.  Such changes were necessary ‘to restore public and market 
confidence’, according to their statements (reproduced in FoEE, 1999: 3).  
 
Widely known as the de facto moratorium, this regulatory blockage delayed any further 
approvals for several years, pending several legislative changes along more precautionary 
lines in 2001.  Meanwhile controversy continued over the scientific basis for safety claims of 
GM products already approved by the EU.  The controversy gained impetus from two lab 
experiments whose surprise results cast doubt on previous evidence of safety.    
 
In UK experiments led by Arpad Pusztai, rats were fed GM potatoes containing a 
transgene for a lectin that was understood to be harmless to mammals.  Yet the rats apparently 
suffered damage to their immune systems and organ development.  The transgene itself was 
not a plausible cause of damage, so Pusztai raised the possibility that the genetic modification 
process had led to an unknown change in the potato; this hypothesis raised doubts about the 
safety of GM foods already on the market.  Soon Pusztai was removed from his post.  This 
affair was turned into a symbol of precautionary science being suppressed for commercial or 
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political reasons, especially through attempts to silence dissent.  Official expertise for GM 
food safety was criticised for optimistic assumptions and inadequate scientific methods to 
detect risks.  Controversy ensued over the methodological basis to detect any potential harm in 
advance.  
 
In Swiss experiments led by Angelica Hilbeck, Bt toxins apparently harmed lacewing 
larvae, a predator of the cornborer pest (Hilbeck et al1998a, 1998b).  The experiments were 
criticised regarding the methodological basis for detecting such harm in the lab and predicting 
harm in the field.  As a wide-ranging rejoinder, the project leader surveyed all previous 
research on non-target harm from Bt toxins and criticised the methods as faulty, incapable of 
detecting any risks (EcoStrat 2000).   
 
Also at issue here was the relative acceptability of any harm.  Bt maize would anyway 
cause less harm to non-target insects than ‘that from the use of conventional insecticides’, 
according to EU expert advice (e.g., SCP 1998).  Their risk assessment implied that any lesser 
harm from Bt maize would be acceptable, on the assumption that it would always replace 
conventional maize sprayed with chemical insecticides.  This assumption became contentious, 
especially because most maize is not anyway sprayed with chemical insecticide.  Regulatory 
procedures came under pressure to evaluate any non-target harm, regardless of its severity or 
likelihood.  
 
Those two controversial cases highlighted precautionary issues in the experimental 
design of risk research.  According to official accounts of the Precautionary Principle, this 
arises only at the risk-management stage, in special cases of uncertainty about risks, as if the 
latter were technical matters for experts (CEC  2000).  Yet disputes arose over the 
methodological validity of research cited to justify safety claims for GM products.  More 
stringent norms for environmental harm, e.g. to non-target insects or farmland biodiversity, 
increased pressures to investigate the prospects and causal pathways of such effects.  These 
were debated as precautionary issues for risk research and assessment, not simply for a later 
stage of risk management (Levidow 2001).   
 
These uncertainties were cited to justify national bans on some products which had 
already gained EU-wide market approval.  For example, Bt maize products were banned by 
Austria, Italy, Greece and later by Germany.  The Commission lacked political authority for 
judicial action against the bans.  
 
5.  Market forces out GM products 
Early EU agbiotech policy symbolically normalised GM products within the agri-food chain.  
In the mid-1990s GM soya and maize were approved for the EU internal market with no 
requirement for a special label.  GM ingredients were invisibly mixed in agri-food chains and 
processed food.  Without GM labelling, the public would be unwittingly consuming GM food 
and thus supporting the technological development.   
 
When the first US shipments of GM grain reached Europe in 1996-97, activists held 
protests linking GM products with pollution and anti-democratic coercion. Local affiliates of 
national and European NGOs demanded GM labelling and non-GM alternatives.  In revolting 
against GM food, many people were ‘voting’ as consumers, in lieu of a democratic procedure 
for a societal decision about a contentious technology.  In the ongoing debate over GM 
labelling, consumer choice was framed in contending ways.   
 
From a pro-agbiotech standpoint, consumers were modelled as rationally pursuing their 
individual interests in safe food.  According to EuropaBio, rules should instead be based upon 
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intrinsic product characteristics which are scientifically verifiable and relevant to consumer 
interests.  The market would distribute societal benefits through farmers’ decisions to buy GM 
seeds.  From this standpoint, process-based labels, encompassing all products of GM 
techniques, would provide no useful information would unfairly stigmatise a safe technology. 
 
EU policy had a similar stance but was put onto the defensive and was eventually 
destabilised.  Demands for process-based GM labelling united a wide range of civil society 
groups which had diverse or ambiguous stances towards agbiotech per se.  Consumer NGOs 
demanded comprehensive labelling of GM products to ensure the consumer right to know and 
choose food according to its origin.  From an anti-biotech standpoint, environmental NGOs 
demanded GM labelling as a democratic right and defence against both risks and 
globalisation; such rules could also be used to deter the commercial use of GM grain.  
Through these cultural discourses and consumer boycott actions, food companies were being 
pressed to use their economic power vis à vis grain traders.  
 
Food companies eventually redefined their interests along the lines of consumer rights.  
European retail chains had been building up their own-brand lines, designed to symbolize 
product quality, as a tool of competitive advantage; this strategy made retailers more 
vulnerable and responsive to consumer concerns.  Without an agreed basis to distinguish 
between GM and non-GM products, however, processed food had an ambiguous identity.  
European retailers found themselves competing to sell processed food as ‘non-GM’, defined 
according to diverse, unstable criteria.  Facing market instability, the European food industry 
sought common rules for distinguishing GM from non-GM products.  Such rules were needed 
to clarify product identity, as a means to re-order markets for processed food.   
 
Labelling rules redefined what is a ‘GM’ product according to detectability criteria 
which became successively broader, supported especially by some member states and the 
European Parliament.  A 1997 Regulation had set a 1 per cent threshold but without agreed 
criteria for detectability.  In lieu of clear statutory rules, in 1998 European retail associations 
devised their own GM labelling rules, though with some differences in criteria across EU 
member states.  To standardise the rules, in 1998 the EU set labelling requirements for 
products with any detectable GM content above the 1 per cent threshold (EC 1998b).   
 
By 1999 European retail chains had excluded GM grain altogether from their own-brand 
products, rather than apply a GM label, thus avoiding any market disadvantage.  Commercial 
pressures against GM crops were extended across Europe and the agro-food chain.  Given the 
strong consumer signals in some countries, food companies changed their ingredients or 
supply-chain sources across Europe.  Farmers came under similar pressures from food 
companies and faced uncertainty about a market for GM grain.  Market forces were deterring 
farmers from a choice of GM crops, thus nearly forcing out agbiotech from the EU (Levidow 
and Bijman 2002).  At least a decade later, this commercial boycott continued.  
 
Consequently, by the late 1990s GM grain was used only for animal feed.   The only 
large market for GM seeds came from Spain, where GM and conventional maize were mixed 
together, without any price disadvantage for GM grain.  Given the blockage of US maize 
exports, Spain had a shortage of animal feed.  For all those reasons, approx. 10 per cent of 
maize fields were cultivated with Bt varieties; this remained the limit of commercial 
cultivation in Europe. 
 
6.  Conclusion  
Agbiotech has been largely blocked in Europe, despite strong government efforts to promote 
its commercialisation.  This blockage has been often explained by public irrationality and 
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ignorance, as well as regulatory burdens or delays, as if a beneficial technology had been 
turned into an innocent victim.  Opponents have been accused of targeting agbiotech as a 
proxy for extraneous issues such as globalisation and sustainable development, thus 
politicising the technology.   
 
Yet politics were always involved in agbiotech, which was co-produced with specific 
forms of the social and natural order.  GM crops were promoted as a means of enhancing 
productive efficiency, sustainably intensifying agriculture, and thus accommodating the 
inexorable global competition for bulk agri-commodities.  That social order was naturalised 
by a techno-fix whose genetic properties would protect society from the threat of competitive 
disadvantage from market forces.  
 
By the early 1990s that project was more clearly linked with neoliberal agendas.  
Competitive imperatives justified policies such as marketization of public-sector research, 
broader patent rights for ‘biotechnological inventions’ and European regulatory harmonisation 
for trans-Atlantic trade liberalisation.  The EU and the US were cooperating to identify and 
overcome any regulatory differences that could pose trade barriers, especially for biotech 
products.  ‘Risk-based regulation’ mandated regulatory approval on the basis of product 
safety, with no further control measures.  As a basis for European integration, a technicist 
harmonization agenda treated regulatory criteria as simply technical matters for experts.  
Proposals for labelling were rejected as lacking any scientific basis, unfairly stigmatising a 
technology, impeding the EU internal market and leaving the EU vulnerable to the threat of a 
US challenge under WTO rules.   
 
Together these policies were designed to make Europe safe for agbiotech as a series of 
safe, eco-efficient, beneficent products.  Conversely, the technology became a political 
instrument for constructing a ‘competition state’.  Success would depend upon naturalising 
that socio-natural order through new discourses and neoliberal policies.   
 
These policies created a vulnerable target for mass opposition.  By the late 1990s they 
turned the technology into an ominous symbol of ‘globalisation’ – as a multiple threat to 
sustainable agriculture, human health, the environment, consumer rights and democracy.  Fred 
Buttel (2000: 1) wondered ‘… whether GMOs might be the Achilles Heel of the globalization 
regime, or conversely whether the globalization regime is the Achilles Heel of GMOs’. 
Indeed, these issues were turned into a mutual vulnerability.  Agbiotech had been promoting a 
socio-natural order which was now attacked as a disorderly threat.  
 
Drawing ominous analogies to the BSE crisis, critics linked agbiotech with intensive 
agri-industrial methods, productive efficiency, its inherent hazards and its political 
unaccountability through globalisation.  Moreover, they stigmatised GM products as 
pollutants.  In France and the UK in particular, activists physically attacked GM field trials 
and grain stores, while portraying themselves as public-interest defenders of democracy and 
the environment.  Agbiotech was opposed as a threat to skilled paysans developing quality 
agriculture.  Their accounts of sustainable agriculture favoured different future scenarios for 
what should be sustained – what kind of economy, environment and society.   
 
Opposition became widespread in civil society.  Similar issues circulated across 
conventional boundaries and remits of NGOs – environmentalist, consumer, farmer, etc. – as 
well as across national boundaries.  Beyond simply ‘activists’, a wider societal participation 
took various forms such as public meetings, protest actions, consumer boycotts, attacks on 
GM crops, etc.  By linking critical perspectives across diverse issues and constituencies, a 
broader citizenry sought to hold governments accountable for their policies – as choices which 
could be different.  
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A decisive arena was the food retail sector.  Consumer boycotts and demands turned 
GM ingredients into an instability for the processed food market.   To stabilise the market, 
European retail chains devised their own GM labelling rules, which were eventually 
formalised and standardised in EU law. Under pressure from these rules and public protest, 
retailers eventually organised a commercial boycott of GM grain, thus deterring cultivation of 
GM crops.  From its original promotion as an essential tool for economic competitiveness, 
agbiotech was turned into a competitive disadvantage. 
 
Safety approvals of GM products were being promoted by citing EU-level expert advice 
in the name of ‘risk-based regulation’.  From the mid-1990s onwards, however, member states 
increasingly disagreed about the risk-assessment criteria, especially what counts as harm and 
as meaningful evidence for clarifying potential harm in advance.  The normal hazards of 
intensive monoculture were not necessarily accepted as a baseline for GM crops.  These 
disagreements undermined the technicist harmonisation agenda which had driven EU 
regulatory standards.  Member states raised more uncertainties as grounds for more rigorous 
evidence of safety, regarding a broader range of potential harms; more stringent agri-
environmental standards corresponded to diverse accounts of sustainable agriculture.  Risk 
assessment was opened up as precautionary issue, warranting questions more difficult to 
answer through the available science.    
 
In all those ways, protest was making Europe unsafe for agbiotech by the late 1990s.  
GM products were blocked along with the neoliberal policies promoting them.  The blockage 
opened up debate and opportunities for alternative futures.  ‘Another world is possible’, a 
prominent slogan of the global justice movement, was adapted as ‘Another agriculture is 
possible.’  Making Europe safe for such alternatives remains a more difficult task.  
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